Defra’s survey of seasonal workers demonstrates exploitation risks of short-term, sponsored visas

The importance of seasonal workers for the agricultural sector is difficult to understate - when the Seasonal Worker Scheme (SWS) was extended for five years in 2024, National Farmers Union President Tom Bradshaw described it as a “huge relief.” Yet, people’s welfare and experiences while on the Seasonal Worker visa are only formally documented through a single annual survey administered by the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), giving us limited understanding of what the SWS is like for workers.

The release of the 2024 survey data clearly demonstrates the labour exploitation risks inherent in the short-term, sponsored nature of the Seasonal Worker visa. This data shows us that exploitation risks are increased by the prevalence of relocation-linked debts, the lack of a viable transfer system between employers, and the absence of an independent grievance mechanism. These three factors can silence workers and trap them in exploitative working conditions. 

We reiterate our calls for the government to address these key risks on the Seasonal Worker Scheme (SWS). This would make for a big first step towards protecting the workers who are so vital for the viability of British agriculture. Ultimately though, the government must look to shift the SWS away from a model of short-term sponsorship that inflates the propensity for labour abuses by design.

Relocation-linked debts are pervasive

Relocation-linked debts are a key way that exploitation risks are increased. Even though only 2% of seasonal workers reported paying a job-finding fee to a recruiter, all workers face baseline pre-arrival costs. These include visa application fees, transportation costs (such as return flight tickets), medical examination fees, and in some cases payment to a national ministry. These costs are significant, with a 2025 Alma Economics study estimating normal pre-arrival costs of £1,142, significantly higher than median monthly salaries in most source countries.

High pre-arrival costs, in turn, mean many workers have to take on debt just to come to the UK. Defra survey data from 2024 and 2023 identified just 59% and 52% of seasonal workers, respectively, being able to fund these pre-arrival costs entirely through savings. FLEX data from 2024 put the number of workers taking out a loan to come to the UK higher, at 70%. 

People take on this debt with the expectation that they will pay it back through future UK earnings. The issue is that visa sponsors (labour providers) do not guarantee employment for the entirety of the six months the visa is valid for. Moreover, they have full control over whether someone is placed on a farm, or is sent home early.

Workers understand this all too well and are disincentivised from reporting labour rights breaches out of fear of being sent home. If they blow the whistle or raise a grievance that results in dismissal, there is no guarantee that they won’t be told to leave the UK, still indebted or having earned too little to make the trip cover things, like education costs and medical treatment for their loved ones. 

Their fears of employer retaliation are rational. The latest Defra survey data from 2024 points to just three-quarters (75%) of workers having worked the full length of their contract. One in twelve workers (8.6%) left the UK after fewer than four months of employment. 

The transfer system is broken

In theory, workers’ right to transfer employers should largely solve the problem described above. If workers could leave exploitative workplaces to move to those that need and value their labour, it would enable reporting of labour abuses. This would tilt the balance of power away from the employer, and reduce instances of exploitation to begin with. It would also help individuals prolong their employment in the UK until the end of their visa.

Home Office guidance establishes a duty for labour providers to have a clear transfer pathway, “including transparent criteria for making a transfer request and a process for considering such requests.” Workers should also normally be allowed to switch jobs, “unless there are significant reasons not to permit this,” such as too little time remaining on their visa or gross misconduct. 

Unfortunately, the reality on the ground is that labour providers have a track record of refusing transfer requests. Of 19% of survey respondents who requested a transfer in 2024, 38% had it refused, according to the latest Defra figures. In nearly one-third (31%) of these refusals, no reason for the decision was given by the labour provider or no response was received by the worker altogether. FLEX’s survey puts the number of refusals amongst the third of workers who requested a transfer even higher, at 55%. With 2023 Defra data also showing similar outcomes to 2024, it is apparent that the serious cracks in the transfer system are not going away.

It may be easy for industry to dismiss self-reported worker outcomes as inaccurate, but our casework experience chimes with Defra’s survey findings. Labour providers don’t make transfer processes sufficiently clear for workers, and we have yet to see transparent criteria presented in writing. We have also observed numerous cases where transfer refusals are substantiated with a blanket reason of ‘unavailability of placements,’ even where people have many months left of their visa. For workers, all of this means that their right to transfer is a right in name only - they cannot rely on it to leave an exploitative employer and take their labour elsewhere.

Grievance mechanisms are unclear and not independent

For workers tied to an exploitative employer, it is difficult to defend one’s rights in practice. Self-organisation or unionisation of seasonal migrants is nearly non-existent. In this context, grievance mechanisms are crucial for workers to be able to voice concerns. The issue is that grievance mechanisms both lack the accessibility and formality necessary to be effective and trusted by workers. 

Grievance procedures are put in place by employers, who serve as the most common first point of contact for workers, according to research by the University of Nottingham. The issues with this are twofold. First, most grievances are not recorded or informally logged, making “it difficult to identify trends, and verify if and how they are resolved.” Second, raising grievances with an exploitative employer carries the risk of dismissal and being sent home, even where this may be unlawful (such as where dismissal would be automatically unfair).

Indeed, of 1,609 Defra survey respondents who had a grievance in 2024, just 15% raised a formal complaint. For those who did not raise a complaint, 30% were worried they would lose their job or their employer would find out, 31% did not believe any action would be taken, and 21% were worried it would impact their right to be in the UK.

Other grievance mechanisms are available through state bodies (e.g. labour enforcement agencies), however, researchers at The University of Nottingham found that “migrant workers’ legal status, paired with the short-term of their stay, make the access to state-based mechanisms challenging.” 

Many workers are also simply unaware of who they can turn to for support. Defra survey data shows that of 236 complaints raised, just one each was addressed to GLAA and UKVI. This leaves workers one on one with their employer or labour provider, unwilling to raise a complaint or afraid of the potential consequences.

How to mitigate exploitation risks

In context of this data and existent research, the government can do more to reduce these underlying factors behind labour exploitation. We recommend it starts with the following:

• Reducing the issue of indebtedness. The government should support the adoption of the Employer Pays Principle (EPP) on the SWS, ensuring industry stakeholders cover all relocation costs. This would follow best practice from other countries running seasonal agricultural schemes, such as the United States, Canada and Australia. A Defra-commissioned EPP feasibility study was published by Alma Economics.

• Ensuring transfers work in practice. The government should ensure labour providers delineate transfer processes and requirements in a separate written document handed to workers, in line with Home Office guidance. It should also conduct proactive inspections to enforce this. In the longer term, however, Defra and the Home Office should establish an independent, central managed transfer system.

• Enabling effective reporting of grievances. To support workers in reporting grievances, Defra and UKVI should develop a centralised, independent grievance mechanism that would work in conjunction with employers’ individual complaints policies. And while labour providers are responsible for worker welfare under Home Office guidance, UKVI should take responsibility for inspecting labour providers’ responses to exploitation or welfare complaints raised by workers.

Whatever reforms are made, the principal problem at the core of the SWS is its structure, premised on short-term sponsorship. As outlined previously in independent reviews by both the Migration Advisory Committee and the ICIBI, short-term visas can lead to labour abuses, and tying workers to a sponsor only increases the likelihood of this. The SWS model really needs a rethink, and the best way to do this is to permit visa holders to work anywhere within agriculture for the duration of their stay.